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ABSTRACT 
A number of countries have recently introduced legislation which holds polluters 
liable for the costs of cleaning up environmental damage they have caused. While in 
principle this can give polluters appropriate incentives to reduce the risk of 
environmental damage, these incentives are weakened if polluters enjoy limited 
liability and can avoid paying large damages through bankruptcy (the ‘judgement 
proofness’ problem). This has led to suggestions that liability be extended to lenders 
such as banks, who will have incentives to condition loans on the effort made by 
firms to reduce environmental damage. However, this in turn can be confounded by 
problems of asymmetric information, and the costs imposed on banks in monitoring 
the environmental risks being incurred by firms. This in turn leads to fears that 
holding banks liable for environmental risks could substantially reduce the use of 
bank debt by firms.  
In this paper we analyse the impact of different environmental liability regimes on the 
capital structure of firms, and in particular with how much bank debt they will use. 
We use a simple theoretical model to show that introducing environmental liability 
only on firms who have limited liability will cause them to increase their use of bank 
debt (essentially to protect their shareholders); extending liability also to banks has an 
ambiguous effect on bank borrowing, but under plausible assumptions will lead to 
lower bank borrowing than with liability only on firms, but higher or lower bank 
borrowing than with no liability at all.  
The US has had the longest history of environmental liability legislation (CERCLA, 
1980), and there have been differences over time in the extent to which banks have 
been held to be liable for environmental damages of insolvent firms. We use US 
industry-level data to estimate a reduced-form model of bank borrowing by polluters 
and show that the empirical model supports the theoretical findings. For industries 
which are heavily exposed to environmental liabilities, such as chemicals, we show 
that the introduction of environmental liability only on firms caused bank borrowing 
to increase by 15 - 20%, but when liability was extended to banks, borrowings 
returned to a level only slightly higher than with no liability. Our findings suggest that 
extending environmental liability to banks does not have drastic consequences for 
bank lending to firms.   2 
1. Introduction. 
Environmental policy has traditionally relied on ex ante regulation (emission 
standards, technology standards, economic instruments) to induce polluters to reduce 
their emissions. But recently some countries have moved towards ex post regulation: 
whereby polluters are made strictly liable for the costs of the environmental damage 
they have already caused. In principle, the anticipation of these liabilities will provide 
polluters with appropriate incentives to reduce the risk of environmental damage (this 
can be thought of as an application of the Coase Theorem). However, this incentive to 
reduce pollution is weakened if polluters enjoy limited financial liability and can 
avoid paying large damages by becoming insolvent (they become ‘judgement proof’).  
One possible solution to this problem that has been proposed is to extend 
environmental liability also to lenders such as banks. Provided they too are not liable 
to bankruptcy (they have ‘deep pockets’) they will have incentives to condition their 
loans on the efforts firms make to reduce the risk of environmental liabilities, and, 
again in principle this will ensure that efficient levels of pollution abatement are 
undertaken (Segerson (1993)).  However, this solution is in turn problematic if there 
are significant asymmetries of information between banks and firms so that it is either 
impossible or expensive for banks to properly monitor environmental risks being run 
by firms
1. If there are significant problems of asymmetric information then this may 
result in both inefficiently low levels of environmental care being taken by polluters
2 
and also distortions to the capital structure of firms. If only firms are held liable for 
environmental damages, and they have limited liability, then firms may take on too 
much bank debt to protect shareholders against environmental risks. On the other 
hand if banks are also held liable, then firms may take on too little bank debt if either 
banks impose significant charges to cover monitoring costs or banks use credit 
rationing in response to the asymmetry of information.  
The best known use of environmental liability legislation is in the USA which 
introduced the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability 
Act (CERCLA) in 1980. This Act holds ‘potentially responsible parties’ (PRP’s) 
jointly and severally liable to pay for the clean-up of contaminated properties. PRP’s 
are owners and operators of sites. The Act contained a ‘Secured Creditor Exemption’ 
whereby lenders were exempt from liability as long as the property was kept mainly 
as security for a loan. There were a number of tests of this exemption, and in 1992 the 
EPA issued a ruling which said that lenders could only be liable as owners if they 
foreclosed on a loan (which meant that lenders avoided foreclosure) or as operators of 
they were “involved in the day-to-day management of the insolvent firm”. There were 
a few cases where this was invoked - e.g. where an employee of a bank was on the 
board of directors. But the case which seemed to open up banks more widely to 
liability was the Fleet Factors case (1990) where the judge ruled that banks could be 
                                                            
1 On the other hand, an argument sometimes advanced for imposing environmental liability on banks is 
that if banks are already monitoring conventional credit risks, then there may be economies of scope in 
extending this monitoring role to include environmental risks, and this could reduce the costs of 
monitoring using traditional ex ante regulation. 
2 See Pitchford (1995), Boyer and Laffont (1997), Balkenborg (1997) Lewis and Sappington (1997). 
   3 
held to have a “capacity to influence” the environmental risks run by operators. The 
argument was that lenders could not gain exemption from liability by pleading 
ignorance, since this would reduce the incentives for banks to carry out environmental 
audits as part of the normal prudential credit approval process. This seemed to imply 
that the normal monitoring of credit risks by banks would have to include 
environmental risks and hence give banks a knowledge of and therefore capacity to 
influence the steps taken by firms to affect environmental risks. Thus for a period of 
time in the US there was a view that banks as well as firms could be held liable for 
environmental damages.  
In the UK the Environment Act (1995) introduced strict liability on PRP’s for 
cleaning up contaminated land. The draft guidance notes for implementation of the 
Act applies six sequential exemption tests which appear to ensure that banks are 
exempt from liability (see Jewell (1997 a, b) for a legal analysis of the EA). However, 
these have still to be tested in court, and there is evidence that UK banks still believe 
there is a small risk they could be held liable for environmental damages of insolvent 
borrowers (McKenzie and Wolfe (1998)). Elsewhere in Europe there are variations in 
liability regimes, and while in principle lenders could be held liable on the same two 
grounds as in the US, no lender has yet been held liable. The EU has been considering 
proposals for harmonisation of liability regimes.  
In this paper we are concerned primarily with an empirical analysis of how the 
environmental liability regimes in the US have affected the capital structure of firms, 
and in particular the extent to which firms have relied on long-term bank borrowing. 
In section 2 we shall set out a simple theoretical model of firms’ choice of capital 
structure and show how different environmental liability regimes affect bank 
borrowing. We shall show that if only firms are held liable, and they have limited 
financial liability, then firms will take on an inefficiently high level of bank debt, 
essentially to protect their shareholders from environmental liabilities. If firms and 
banks are held jointly liable, then we show that the effect on bank borrowing is 
ambiguous. However, on plausible assumptions the level of bank borrowing will be 
lower with joint liability than with liability only on firms; bank borrowing may be 
higher or lower with joint liability than when there is no liability.   
In section 3 we use US industry-level data to estimate a reduced-form model of long-
term bank debt over three time phases: (i) pre-1980 (i.e. pre-CERCLA): no liability; 
(ii) 1981-1990 (post-CERCLA, pre-Fleet Factors): liability only on firms; (iii) post-
1991 (i.e. post-Fleet Factors) joint liability on firms and banks. We show that the 
empirical analysis strongly supports the theoretical predictions: bank borrowing rises 
when liability is imposed only on firms; when liability is extended to banks, then 
bank borrowing is lower than when liability is imposed only on firms, but is slightly 
higher than with no liability at all. For industries, such as Chemicals, which are 
heavily exposed to CERCLA liabilities, the model predicts that imposing 
environmental liabilities on firms would cause bank borrowing to rise by 15-20%, 
ceteris paribus, while if liability is imposed jointly on firms and banks then bank 
borrowing in such heavily exposed industries would only be about 1-2% above the 
level without any liability. Our results do not suggest that extending environmental 
liabilities to banks, which would be desirable in terms of improving the level of effort   4 
firms make to reduce environmental risks, would have a drastic effect on bank 
borrowing by firms.   5 
2.  The Theoretical Model 
In this section we set out a simple theoretical model to show how different liability 
regimes affect the choice of capital structure by firms. The model extends the work of 
Feess and Hege (1997), which, to our knowledge, is the first paper which focuses 
explicitly on the impact of liability regimes on capital structure. 
We analyse a firm which is deciding whether to undertake a project with investment 
cost I, and if so, how to finance it. There are three possible ways of funding the 
project: by equity, supplied by the owner-manager (hereafter owner) of the firm who 
has initial wealth W; or by debt which can take the form of either bank (private) debt 
or by public debt (corporate bonds).  Both forms of debt are supplied on competitive 
markets
3, and we denote by D the amount of debt used. The two forms of debt are 
equivalent except for a lump sum benefit or cost of using bank debt rather than public 
debt, denoted by m which may reflect factors such as better monitoring or negotiation 
capacity of the bank or the higher cost of bank debt. Thus m may be positive (if the 
benefit of bank debt outweighs the cost) or negative (the reverse occurs). The fixed 
cost nature of this benefit/cost means that the firm will only choose one form of debt. 
Denote by Φ  a variable which takes the value 1 if the firm chooses bank debt and the 
value 0 if it chooses public debt. Then Z(Φ , m) ≡  (2Φ  -1)m is the gain (or loss) to the 
owner from the choice of public or private debt. Finally I - D is the amount of funds 
supplied by the owner to finance the project. The owner is assumed to be risk neutral. 
Rather than explicitly model why the capital structure might matter to the firm, we 
simply assume that the return to the project, R(D), is a strictly concave function of D, 
where  D*  = argmax(R(D)),   0 < D* < I, is  the optimal level of debt. This 
formulation is consistent with a wide range of theories of optimal capital structure, 
such as tax shields, signalling, costs of financial distress. Finally we assume that I-D* 
< W < I so that the owner can finance the equity required for the optimal capital 
structure, but not the whole project.  Indeed we shall make the stronger assumption 
that for all relevant values of D, W > I - D; this assumption is made just to avoid 
having to worry about cases where the owner is wealth constrained. 
We assume that the project carries a risk of causing environmental damage X, with 
probability P(e), where e ≥  0 is the level of care expenditure made by the firm. For all 
e ≥  0, 1 ≥   P(e) ≥  0 and P′ (e) < 0, P′′ (e) > 0. We suppose that the firm chooses e at 
the start of the project and that it is possible to condition debt or insurance contracts 
on e (though, as noted below, there may be costs to monitoring such effort).  
We denote by L ≤  X  the level of liability imposed by a regulator. The aim of the 
regulator is to maximise welfare, which is defined as profits earned by the owner 
minus expected environmental damage net of any liability payments. We shall 
consider in turn five possible regimes for how liability may be imposed: Regime 0: 
No liability; Regime I: Liability only on the firm with compulsory insurance with 
costless monitoring; Regime II: Liability only on the firm with compulsory insurance 
                                                            
3 The assumption of competitive markets is significant. Heyes (1996) and Balkenborg (1997) show that 
the conclusions drawn by Pitchford (1995) about the implications of environmental liability in models 
of competitive banking with asymmetric information do not all carry through when the banking market 
is imperfectly competitive.    6 
with costly monitoring; Regime III:  Liability only on the firm with no requirement 
for insurance; Regime IV:  Liability jointly on the firm and any bank which has lent to 
the firm, but no requirement for insurance. 
2.1  Regime 0:  No Liability 
In this regime the firm is not held liable for any damages in the event of any 
environmental accident occurring, so clearly it will make no investment in care 
expenditure, i.e. e = 0. The owner has then to choose the capital structure (i.e. how 
much of the investment cost I is financed with debt D or with equity) and the form of 
debt, bank or public, Φ . D and Φ   are chosen to maximise: 
  ΠΦ Φ (,)[() ][ ]( ) DR D D I D m =− − − + − 21     (1) 
where the first term is the value of the equity-holding of the owner, the second term is 
the equity invested by the owner, and the third term is the net gain/cost from the 
choice of private or public debt. We can rearrange (1) as: 
  ΠΦ Φ (,) () ( ) DR D I m =− + − 2 1        ( 2 )  
Given the separable nature of Π ,  the choice of D and Φ  can be simply summarised 
by: 
i) choice of D: D is chosen so to maximise Π (D, Φ ) or equivalently R(D) so D = D*;  
ii) choice of Φ :  Φ  = 1 if m ≥  0 and Φ  = 0 if m < 0. Call this assignment rule Φ *. 
Then Z(Φ *, m)= |  m | . 
Thus without liability the firm earns profits:  Π 0 ≡− + RD I m ( *)    and society gets 
welfare   VP X 00 0 ≡− Π () .  
2.2  Regime I: Liability on Firm with Compulsory Insurance with Costless 
Monitoring 
We assume that a regulator imposes a liability L on the firm, and requires that the 
firm can pay this liability through appropriate insurance. Before allowing the project 
to proceed the regulator requires that the firm demonstrates how its liability is to be 
insured. This can take the form of self-insurance, denoted by S, where the owner 
pledges to cover the amount S  of the liability; the balance L - S  must then be insured 
externally, and we assume that there is a competitive market in insurance contracts, 
offered by either insurance companies or banks. For this section we assume that both 
banks and insurance companies can costlessly monitor the level of care expenditure, 
e, undertaken by the firm, and hence can costlessly observe P(e), the probability of 
environmental liability being incurred. The level of self-insurance, S, is subject to an 
upper bound by the available wealth of the owner, defined as: 
  S DWI D R DD W R DI () ( )(() () ≡−−+ −=+ −            (3)   7 
There are three components of the owner’s maximum available wealth: initial wealth 
W, less the costs of the funds put up to fund the project (I -D), plus the equity returns 
on the project (R(D) - D). 
With our assumption of costless monitoring and competitive insurance markets, the 
cost to the owner of external insurance is just the actuarial premium P(e)(L - S), while 
the cost of self-insurance is simply P(e)S. 
The problem facing the owner can now be summarised as choosing the capital 
structure of the firm, D, the form of debt, Φ , the level of care expenditure, e, and the 
level of self insurance, S, to maximise: 
ΠΦ Φ (,, , )[() ][ ][( ) ( ) ( ) ]( ) De S L R DDI DP e S P e L Se m ≡− − − −+ − + + − 21  
              =
   
RD I PeS Pe L S e m
st S SD
() [( ) ( ) ( ) ]( ) ( )
.. ( )
−− + − + + −
≤
21 4 Φ
   
It is clear from the formulation of (4) that the solution decomposes into three stages: 
(i) Choice of e and S: the owner-manager chooses e and S to minimise: 
 
peS pe L S e peL e
stS S D
() () ( ) ()
.. ( )
=− + = +
≤
  
 
The objective function does not depend on S since the owner is completely indifferent 
between self-insurance and external insurance. For simplicity we assume S = 0. e is 
then chosen to minimise p(e)L + e. Denote the solution by E(L), where E(L) satisfies 
the first order condition:     
  pELL '[ ( )] += 10             ( 5 )  
This is just the usual condition that the marginal cost of effort equals the marginal 
reduction in the expected  cost of liability. Totally differentiating (5) yields: 
  EL
p
pL
'( )
'
''
=− > 0          ( 6 )  
so that the optimal level of care is an increasing function of liability. 
Finally denote by K(L) = p(E(L))L + E(L) the minimum cost to the owner of facing 
liability L under costless mandatory insurance. Note that K′ (L) = p(E(L)) > 0. 
(ii) Choice of D. While the level of D affects the upper bound of self-insurance, we 
have seen that this plays no role, so D is chosen simply to maximise R(D), i.e. D = 
D*, the same as with no liability. 
(iii) Choice of Φ . As with no liability the owner will choose Φ  by the rule Φ * i.e. Φ  = 
1 if  m ≥  0, Φ  = 0 if m < 0.    8 
Thus for any given level of liability L with mandatory costless insurance the firm 
chooses D = D*, e =  e* = E(L), S = 0, Φ  = Φ * and earns profits 
  Π *( ) ( *) ( ) LR D I K Lm ≡− − +  
We now consider the problem of the regulator in setting L. This is chosen to 
maximise social welfare, defined as profits less the expected costs of damage not 
covered by liability payments, i.e. L is chosen to maximise: 
  VL L pEL X L () * () (() ) [ ] ≡− − Π  for which the first order condition is: 
 
dL
dL
pE X L pEL
Π *( )
'' [ ] [() ] −− + = 0       ( 7 )  
Since 
dL
dL
KL p E L
Π *( )
'( ) [ ( )] =− =−   (7) reduces to 
−− = = = pE X L ie L L X '' { ] . . * 0  
This is just the obvious condition that with costless mandatory insurance it is optimal 
to impose full liability on the firm.  
Thus with costless mandatory insurance we get the first-best outcome: 
(i) the externality is fully internalised as a liability to the firm (L= L* = X); 
(ii) the firm chooses effort so that p′ (e)X + 1 = 0, i.e. the marginal cost of a bit more 
effort equals the marginal benefit of reduced expected environmental damage cost; 
(iii) the firm makes the optimal choice of capital structure, D = D*; 
(iv) the firm makes the optimal choice of private or public debt, Φ   = Φ * 
This is the first-best solution that would be obtained if the regulator had directly 
chosen D, e, Φ  to maximise 
  RD I e peX m () ( ) ( ) −−− + − 21 Φ  
i.e. profits minimise expected environmental damage costs. Instead, the regulator only 
has to set liability L = L* = X and leave it to the profit-maximising owner to choose 
the first-best values for D, e and Φ . 
 Finally note that the project should only proceed if V(L*) ≥  0, i.e.Π *(X) ≥  0. 
2.3  Regime II: Liability on Firm with Compulsory Insurance with Costly 
Monitoring 
As in the previous section we assume that the regulator imposes as a liability L on the 
owner in the event of environmental damage being incurred and requires that this risk 
is fully insured, either by self insurance or through external insurance contracts. But 
now we suppose that there is a moral hazard problem: banks and insurance companies   9 
cannot costlessly monitor e. If the owner has announced care expenditure E(L), of 
which an amount S, 0 ≤  S ≤  L is self-insured, and E(L) cannot be observed, the firm 
would have an incentive to carry out only expenditure level E(S) ≤  E(L). If the owner 
manager wants to commit to a level of effort e > E(S), then banks and insurance 
companies will have to carry out monitoring activities which are costly
4.  
We assume that banks and insurance companies incur monitoring costs 
  CeS e ES e ES (, ) [ ( ) ] ( ) ≡− ≥ γ            
where γ  is an increasing strictly concave function (γ′  ≥  0, γ′′  > 0) with γ (0) = γ′ (0)= 0, 
i.e. the marginal cost of doing the first bit of monitoring is zero. While the cost 
function C(e, S) is common to both bank and insurance companies, we also assume 
that there is a fixed cost difference between banks and insurance companies in 
monitoring costs denoted by δ , where δ   > (<) 0 means that banks incur higher (lower) 
monitoring costs than insurance companies.  Thus the cost of monitoring by a bank is: 
γ δ (( ) ) eE S −+ .  Finally we assume that if a firm decides to borrow from a bank, 
then it has a choice of whether to insure from a bank or from an insurance company; 
while if the firm uses public debt, then it must use insurance companies to monitor its 
activities. This assumption is meant to capture the possibility that there may be 
economies of scope in a bank monitoring both the financial and environmental risks 
of a loan and the bank is only willing to incur the costs of monitoring the insurance 
risk if it is also monitoring the loan. Thus there is an additional benefit from using 
bank debt, that the firm maybe able to reduce monitoring costs by an amount b = 
min(0, δ ).  
We continue to assume that the market for insurance by either banks or insurance 
companies is competitive, so that the firm has to pay the full cost of both the 
actuarially fair insurance premium and the cost of monitoring for any liability that is 
not self-insured. The problem for the owner faced with liability L and mandatory 
costly insurance is to choose D, Φ , e, S to maximise: 
! (,, , ) () [ ( ) [ () ]( ) ΠΦ Φ Φ De S LR DIp e L e e E S b ≡− − + + −+ − − γ 2 1    (8) 
  st S SD .. ( )         ≤          
(8) differs from (4) by the inclusion of the cost of monitoring. Again it is possible to 
decompose the decision into three stages. 
(i) Choice of e and S.  For any given D, and hence SD W I RD () () =− + , the firm 
chooses e and S to minimise: 
  peL e e ES st S SD () [ () ] .. ( ) ++ − ≤ γ             
                                                            
4 Note that the assumption that e can be monitored, albeit at a cost, and therefore debt and insurance 
contracts can be conditioned on e,  is an important one. Pitchford (1995), Balkenborg(1997), Heyes 
(1996), Boyer and Laffont (1997) analyse the case when there is a moral hazard problem but without 
the possibility of monitoring e, so any debt or insurance contract can condition payments only on 
whether or not an environmental accident occurs.   10 
It is obvious that to minimise these costs, the firm should choose the maximum level 
of self-insurance, since this minimises monitoring costs. This leaves the problem of 
choosing  e to minimise:   peL e e ESD () [ (( ) ) ] ++ − γ      for  which  the  first  order 
condition is: 
  ′ ++ ′ = pL 10 γ          ( 9 )  
Define the solution as  !(, ) ELD. Total differentiation of (9) shows that: 
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So effort will be an increasing function of liability
5, but the effect of an increase in 
debt on care expenditure depends on the sign of R′ : if increasing debt increases R, and 
hence the maximum amount of self insurance, then care expenditure will increase. 
Note also that as long as LS D E L D E L >< () !(, ) ()   then  , i.e. the optimal effort level 
with costly insurance is less than with costless insurance, for the simple reason that 
the firm has to pay the monitoring costs of committing to higher levels of effort. 
Define  !(, ) [ !(, ) ] !(, ) [ !(, ) (( ) ] KLD pELD L ELD ELD ESD ≡+ + − γ  as the minimum 
cost of insuring against liability L when the debt level of the firm is D. It is 
straightforward to see that: 
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(ii) Choice of D. We can now solve the problem of the firm as choosing D and Φ  to 
maximise: 
  RD I KLD m b () !(, ) ( ) −− + − − 21 ΦΦ  
The first order condition is: 
  ′ −= ′ + ′′′ =⇒ ′ =⇒= RD
K
D
RD E RD RD D D ()
!
() () () *
∂
∂
γ 00       
Thus, since the firm wishes to maximise self insurance, and the limit on self 
insurance is increasing in the returns on the project, this simply reinforces the firm’s 
wish to choose the capital structure which maximises the returns to the project. 
Because of mandatory insurance cover, there is no incentive to increase debt as a 
means of passing liability on to lenders. This would still need to be covered by 
mandatory insurance and increasing debt beyond D* just reduces the scope for self-
insurance and so increases the monitoring cost the firm has to pay. 
                                                            
5 Note that this result depends crucially on the assumption that effort can be monitored. As noted in 
footnote 1, in other models where effort cannot be monitored, payments can depend only on whether or 
not an environmental accident has occurred, and, as shown by Pitchford (1995), in such models 
increasing liability may reduce the care effort made by firms.   11 
(iii): Choice of Φ . If the firm chooses to use bank debt then it gets a net benefit of m-b 
where b = min{0, δ } ≤  0; if it chooses to use public debt then it receives a net benefit 
of -m. So the firm will choose bank debt (Φ  = 1) if m ≥  b/2, and public debt (Φ  = 0)  
if m < b/2. Call this assignment rule  ! Φ . Since b ≤  0, then in general there will be a 
wider range of values of m for which bank debt will be chosen compared to the case 
of costless monitoring, because the choice of bank debt now offers a choice of 
monitoring agency which is not available if public debt is chosen. Using this rule the 
value of the net benefit of choosing the optimal type of debt is  m
b
−
2
. 
To summarise, for any given liability level, L, with mandatory but costly insurance 
the firm chooses D = D*, eE L DSS D == = !( , *), ( *), ! ΦΦ , and earns profits: 
  ! () (* ) !(, * ) Π LR D I K L D m
b
≡− − + −
2
    
The regulator will choose L to maximise  !() ! () ( !( , *))( ) VL L pELD X L =− − Π  for 
which the first order condition is: 
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Since 
∂
∂
∂
∂
! !
[ !( , *)]
Π
L
K
L
pELD =− =−  (10) again gives the optimal rule for liability: 
LLX == ! .  This is the optimal second best outcome in which with mandatory 
coverage and costly monitoring:  there is full internalisation of environmental damage 
costs, the firm chooses the first best capital structure, as in the first-best with 
mandatory insurance and costless monitoring; but there is a lower level of care 
expenditure,  !(,* ) () EXD EX < , and there will be a wider range of values m for 
which bank debt is preferred to public debt, compared to the case of costless 
monitoring. Again this outcome is exactly the same as if the regulator chose all the 
variables e, S, D and Φ ; so the second-best outcome can be achieved by just imposing 
mandatory insurance cover with full liability for environmental damage, and leave it 
to the firm to choose the second-best level of care expenditure and financial structure. 
2.4  Regime III: Liability of the Firm with No Mandatory Insurance 
We now assume that in the event of environmental damage being incurred the firm is 
required to pay liability L, but is no longer required to insure this liability, either by 
itself (self-insurance) or by external parties. We continue to assume that an external 
insurance contract will involve paying costly monitoring services to overcome the 
moral hazard problem. Because of limited liability, the maximum amount for which 
the owner may be held directly liable is just the equity  invested in  the firm:  
  RD D SD W RD I () () () −≤ =+ −    12 
(since I - D ≤  W). Since there is no requirement to take out insurance to cover any 
liability greater than R(D )- D, it is clear that the firm can simply ignore any liability 
greater than R(D) - D and, since monitoring by external agencies is costly, has no 
incentive to take out any external insurance. Define Ψ (L, D) = min (L, R(D) - D). 
Then,  S = Ψ (L, D), and the problem for the firm is to choose D, e and Φ   to 
maximise: 
  ΠΦ Ψ Φ (, ,|) () [( )(,) ]( ) De L RD I pe LD e m ≡− − + + − 2 1                (11) 
Again the solution can be decomposed as follows: 
(i) Choice of e. Since (11) is similar to (4), it is clear that the optimal choice of e is 
given by eE L D E L D ==
~
(, ) ( (, ) ) Ψ .  If  L < R(D)  - D, 
∂
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∂
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= ′ >= 00 . While if 
L ≥  R(D) - D  
∂
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~
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D
ER == ′′ − 01   which says that the effect of an increase in 
debt on care expenditure depends on the sign of R′  - 1, i.e. if an increase in debt 
increases the equity value of the firm (because it increases returns more than it 
increases debt) than this will increase care, because more of the owner’s  equity is at 
risk. However if increasing debt reduces the equity value of the firm then that will 
reduce the care taken by the firm. 
It is straightforward to see that 
~
(, ) !(, ) () ELD ELD EL ≤<, where the first inequality 
arises because 
~
(, ) ( (, ) ) (() ) !(, ) ELD E LD ESD ELD =≤ ≤ Ψ . 
Finally define 
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(, ) KLD pELD LD ELD =+ Ψ  as the minimum cost of facing   
environmental liability L when the firm has debt D and limited liability. If  L < R(D) - 
D, 
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== 0, while if L ≥  R(D) - D 
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pE R == ′ − 01 . In the rest 
of this section we shall concentrate on the more interesting case where L ≥  R(D)-D. 
(ii) Choice of D. The firm chooses D to maximise:  RD I KLD m ()
~
(, ) ( ) −− + − 21 Φ  
for which the first order condition is:  ′ −= ⇒ ′ =−
−
< RD
K
D
RD
p
p
()
~
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()
∂
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1
0.  So  
the optimal level of debt is DDD =>
~
*. Thus if the liability is imposed only on the 
firm, with no requirement for mandatory insurance cover, and the firm can limit its 
liability to the equity holding, then there is a clear incentive to distort the capital 
structure in the direction of too much debt. 
(iii) Choice of Φ . As in the first-best case, the firm will choose Φ =Φ *, i.e. use bank 
debt if m > 0 and public debt if m < 0. 
In summary, assuming that LR D D ≥− (
~
)
~
,  the firm sets e = 
~
(,
~
),
~
, ELD D D =  Φ =Φ
* and earns profits: 
~
() (
~
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~
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~
) Π LR DI K L Dm ≡− − +                 (12).   13 
 Since (12) does not depend on L, 
~
'( ) Π L = 0. 
For  LR D D ≥− (
~
)
~
, social welfare is 
~
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~
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~
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)] VL L pELD X RD D ≡− − − Π .  
Thus any liability in the range  RD D L X (
~
)
~
−≤≤  will lead to exactly the same 
outcome, and so the best the regulator can do is to achieve care level 
~
(,
~
) ELD. So if 
the only instrument available to the regulator is the level of liability, and if the 
regulator cannot impose mandatory insurance cover, then the level of care 
expenditure will be below the second best level, while the capital structure of the firm 
will be distorted to give too high a level of borrowing. The choice of bank or public 
debt is the same as the simple rule Φ * which the firm followed with either no liability 
or in the first best case with liability and mandatory insurance with costless 
monitoring. 
2.5  Regime IV:   Joint Liability on Firm and Bank, no mandatory insurance 
Finally we analyse the case where liability L is imposed jointly on the firm and bank 
lender, so that in the event that the liability cannot be paid by the owner, then it will 
be paid by the bank, if the firm has borrowed from a bank. Note that if the firm has 
used public debt, then it is assumed that it is not possible for individual holders of 
corporate debt to undertake any monitoring of the firm’s behaviour, and so they 
would be exempt from any liability. 
We follow Feess and Hege(1997) in noting that this case can be viewed as a 
combination of the two previous cases. If the firm decides to borrow from a bank, 
then the bank will insist that any liability to which it is exposed must be fully covered 
by insurance and the level of care expenditure appropriately monitored. The outcome 
will thus be as if we were in the regime of mandatory insurance with costly 
monitoring, except that the firm has chosen to use bank financing, i.e. Φ  = 1. The 
solution, as in Regime II, will result in the firm setting D = D*, 
SS DeE L D == (* ) , !( , *) and will yield the firm profits:  
  Π
1() (* ) !(, * ) LR D I K L D m b ≡− − + −                    (13) 
(13) differs from (10) only in the last term because Φ  = 1, necessarily, rather than 
being set optimally. 
On the other hand if the firm chooses public debt, then holders of public debt cannot 
be held liable, and then, as in Regime III, the owner can only be held liable to the 
extent of the equity invested in the firm. So if Φ  = 0 the firm will set 
DD SR D D eE L D == −=
~
,(
~
)
~
,
~
(,
~
) and earn profits: 
  Π
0() (
~
)
~
(,
~
) LR DI K L Dm ≡− − −                      (14) 
which again differs from (12) because Φ  is necessarily 0 rather than being chosen 
optimally.   14 
The only decision left now is for the firm to choose which form of debt it will use, 
and it will choose bank debt (Φ   = 1) iff: 
R D IK L D mbR D IK L D m
m
b
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≡− − − i.e.iff    where
θ
θ
2
             (15) 
Now it is straightforward to see that θ  ≥  0, since the second term in brackets is the 
result of choosing e and D to maximise: 
  Ge D R D p e L e E S D e
1(, ) ( ) [() ( ( ( ) ) ) ] ≡− + − + γ  
while the first term in brackets is the result of choosing e and D to maximise: 
  Ge D R D p e LR D D e
0( , ) ( ) [ ( )(min{ ,( ( ) )}) ] ≡− − +  
θ   ≥  0 becauseGe D Ge D
01 (, ) (, ) ≥ ,  for two reasons: the limitation of potential 
liability the firm is exposed to, and the fact that there is no need to pay monitoring 
costs. 
Now in the case of no liability (Regime 0), liability with mandatory insurance and 
costless monitoring (Regime I) and liability of the firm with no mandatory insurance 
(Regime III), the firm will choose bank debt iff m ≥  0; in the case of liability and 
mandatory insurance with costly monitoring (Regime II) the firm will choose bank 
debt iff m ≥  b/2; so (16) tells us that with joint liability on the firm and the bank 
(Regime IV) the firm will use bank debt for a lower range of parameter values than 
Regime II, and will use it less (more) than in Regimes 0, I and III if θ  ≥  -b/2 (θ  < -
b/2); recall that b = min(0,δ ) is non-positive. 
Thus if lender liability is imposed on the firm and bank jointly, then, if the firm 
chooses bank debt we will get the second best level of care expenditure and the first-
best capital structure, but if it chooses public debt, we will get inefficiently high level 
of debt and less than second-best level of care expenditure. The firm is more likely to 
choose public debt than in the second-best assignment rule. 
2.6  Summary 
This completes the analysis of the outcomes of the five liability regimes. We now 
summarise the implications of these results for the empirical analysis which follows. 
We shall model bank borrowing over three time periods: (i) pre-CERCLA, which 
corresponds to Regime 0: No Liability; (ii) post-CERCLA but pre-Fleet-Factors, 
which we shall take to correspond to Regime III: Liability only on Firm, with No 
Mandatory Insurance; and (iii) post-CERCLA and post-Fleet-Factors which we shall 
take to correspond to Regime IV: Joint Liability on Firm and Bank, with No 
Mandatory Insurance. We are interested in how the extent of bank borrowing by 
different industries varies across the three phases, or equivalently Liability Regimes, 
and the analysis shows that this depends on two factors: the level of debt, D, and 
whether borrowing was from banks or from the public, Φ .   15 
The analysis shows that moving from phase (i) to phase (ii), i.e. when CERCLA 
introduced liability on firms only, but without mandatory insurance, should 
unambiguously increase bank borrowing: the firm will choose debt level 
~
* DD >  and 
will choose to use bank rather than public borrowing for the same parameter values as 
with no liability (Φ  = 1 iff m ≥  0). Moving from phase (ii) to phase (iii), by extending 
liability fully to banks, will have an ambiguous effect on bank borrowing; first, the 
level of borrowing will revert to the pre-liability (phase (i)) level of debt (D*), so 
bank lending would fall; but, compared to the no liability case, the firm will make 
more or less use of bank borrowing depending on whether θ  < -b/2  or θ  ≥  -b/2. In 
general one would expect that the unambiguously negative effect of the first factor 
would mean that bank lending would be less when liability is extended from the firm 
to include the bank, but the ambiguity of the second factor means that it is not 
possible to predict whether bank borrowing with joint liability would be greater or 
less than bank borrowing with no liability.  If the second effect is weak, then one 
would expect bank borrowing to return to close to the pre-CERCLA level. 
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3. Empirical Analysis of the Effects of Environmental Liability on Bank 
Borrowing. 
In this section we use US data to estimate the effect of both CERCLA and the Fleet 
Factors case on the level of industrial bank borrowing. We estimate a reduced-form 
model of bank borrowing over the period 1973-97 using data for 14 industries, and 
use dummies for both CERCLA and Fleet Factors to divide the period into three 
phases: (i) pre-CERCLA: No Liability; (ii) post-CERCLA, pre-Fleet-Factors: 
Liability only on Firms; (iii) post-CERCLA and post-Fleet-Factors: Joint Liability on 
Firms and Banks. To motivate our choice of variables for the reduced-form model of 
bank borrowing, we begin by briefly summarising some previous studies of the 
determinants of firms’ capital structure.
6 
3.1 Survey of Previous Studies of Firms’ Capital Structure. 
We focus on the relationship between firms’ characteristics and firms’ capital 
structure. The quantity of commercial loans taken out by firms is the equilibrium 
result of the profit-maximising behaviour of firms and banks, and in summary it is 
determined by three types of variables: macroeconomic variables, such as interest 
rates or GNP (affecting both demand and supply); supply variables, reflecting credit 
suppliers’ characteristics and their preferences over customers’ characteristics; 
demand variables reflecting firms’ choice of capital structure. When estimating a 
reduced-form function to explain bank borrowing by firms these three sets of 
variables interact, sometimes with opposite effects on supply or demand. This may 
leave undetermined the net effect and thus the sign and the statistical significance of a 
reduced form regression. 
Firms’ capital structure concerns the proportion of equities over debt, the proportion 
of debt that is publicly issued or privately borrowed and the term structure of debt. 
The main decision about capital structure studied in the literature concerns the 
proportion of debt to borrow privately and the proportion to borrow publicly. Bank 
financing is considered less expensive than public debt, only larger firms thus rely on 
public debt, because they can spread fixed issuance costs over a larger amount. On 
the other hand monitoring costs from banks may make bank lending more expensive.  
The demand for bank loans depends on interest rates, the costs of alternative funds 
and firms’ characteristics. The supply of bank loans depends again on interest rates, 
deposits and capital requirements, banks’ costs, and firms’ characteristics, since 
banks will prefer to allocate to less risky firms than to more risky ones. We survey 
three studies: Johnson (1997), Houston and James (1996), Titman and Wessels 
(1988), which for brevity will be referred to as J, HJ and TW;  these studies use 
reduced form regressions of the proportion of long-term private debt on firms’ 
characteristics. Some of these characteristics are not directly observable and thus 
proxies or indicators are used instead. The firms’ characteristics considered are the 
following: 
Age: this is usually measured by the numbers of years since incorporation. Age is 
used as a proxy of reputation: older firms have developed a reputation for reliability 
                                                            
6 See Valentini (1999) for a more extensive survey.   17 
and thus can rely more on public debt. On the contrary younger firms may be 
considered too costly to administer and monitor by the banks, and do not necessarily 
have to rely on bank debt. The relationship is thus that older firms have a higher 
proportion of public debt, while very young firms have a higher proportion of private 
non-bank debt. Middle aged firms should have a higher proportion of bank debt. J 
finds a positive coefficients of age in estimating long run public debt, while for bank 
debt the coefficient was not significant and for private non-bank debt it is negative. 
Size: The leverage ratio may be also related to size as well as the term structure of 
debt. Small firms rely more heavily on bank debt than larger firms, and usually prefer 
short term debt rather than issuing larger term debt because of the lower fixed costs 
associated with this alternative. Size is usually measured by sales or total assets or 
quit rates (the idea is that larger firms provide better career opportunities and thus 
have lower quit rates). Size is also used as another proxy for reputation. TW first 
determine the relationship between logs of sales and quit rates and size with a factor 
analysis. They find that sales have a positive coefficient and quit rates have a negative 
coefficient in determining size. Second they estimate the impact of size (as estimated 
through factor analysis) on long term  and short term debt, and find that it has a 
positive impact on long term debt and a negative one on short term debt. J measures 
size with total assets and age (older firms are usually larger) and finds that the 
coefficient of size is positive for public long term debt and bank long term debt. HJ 
measure size with the logs of assets and find a negative relationship with bank debt 
(confirming one of the explanations given above that larger firms rely more on public 
debt). 
Collateral value of assets: firms need funds to finance their fixed assets, on the other 
hand fixed assets may be used as a collateral for default debt. The main variable used 
to proxy the collateral value of assets is the ratio of fixed assets (inventory, plant and 
equipment) over total assets. TW also use the ratio of intangible assets over total 
assets as collateral value but find a non significant coefficient for both long and short 
term debt. J finds a positive coefficient for public debt and for bank debt, and a 
negative one for non bank private debt. J also measures the collateral value of assets 
by leverage and market to book ratio. Leverage has a positive impact on public debt 
and on bank debt, and a negative impact on private non bank debt. It must be said 
however that leverage is not a predetermined variable, as it contains the amount of 
debt itself, and it is thus correlated with the residuals. The market to book ratio is non 
significant for public debt, positive for private non bank debt and negative for bank 
debt. 
Non debt tax shield: tax deductions for depreciation and investment tax credit are 
substitutes for the tax benefits of debt financing. TW use tax credit over total assets or 
depreciation over total assets but they find a non significant coefficient for both cases 
in explaining long and short term debt. 
Growth: TW measure growth by R&D as a percentage of sales or capital expenditure 
over total assets or with percentage variation of total assets; in all cases the coefficient 
for growth is positive for long term debt. By contrast, HJ measure growth by the 
market to book ratio and find a negative coefficient for growth (they also use R&D/S 
and still find a negative coefficient).   18 
Volatility: this variable may have different impacts depending whether a demand or a 
supply function is estimated. On the one hand, firms with higher volatility of earnings 
would prefer to have the option to renegotiate the debt and thus prefer private debt to 
public debt, and would prefer a more secured long term debt than a short term one. 
On the other side lenders view more volatile firms as more credit risky because they 
may experience more states in which cash flows are too low to repay the debt and so 
they are less willing to lend to such firms. The net effect on the amount of bank loans 
thus is ambiguous. TW use the standard deviation of percentage changes in operating 
income but this variable is not significant for either long term or short term debt. J 
instead finds a negative coefficient for public debt (consistent with a demand 
function) and a non significant coefficient for private debt. 
Uniqueness: the more unique the firm is the more specific are the workers skills and 
the capital characteristics. In the event of bankruptcy the more specialised the asset is 
the less its liquidation value and thus the lower the collateral value of fixed assets. 
These firms are considered more risky to lenders and thus they should find it more 
difficult to find loans. TW in fact find a negative coefficient of uniqueness for long 
and short term debts, measuring uniqueness by R&D/S, selling expenses, quit rates 
and a dummy variable which is the SIC classification. J instead uses a dummy 
variable which is the product of fixed asset ratio by the SIC classification, and he 
finds a negative coefficient of this variable in explaining public debt, while he finds it 
not significant for private debt. 
Profitability: the past profitability and thus the amount of earnings that could be 
retained to refinance future projects should also be an important determinant of 
capital structure. This variable should have opposite effects on demand and supply. 
For demand, profitability is an alternative source of financing and thus should be 
negatively related to debt; for supply, profitability should be a positive indicator of 
good financial health of the firm and should be positively related to credit allocation. 
Indicators are operating income over sales and operating income over total assets. TW 
use both measures and find a negative relationship for long term debt and short term 
debt. 
 
The impact of environmental liability on capital structure has recently been analysed 
by Garber and Hammit (1909) (GH). In fact GH investigate whether CERCLA has 
increased the cost of capital of firms belonging to the chemical industry. Because 
Superfund liability adds an element of risk to the securities of a firm, investors will 
require higher returns as compensation of the increased risk. Superfund should thus 
increase the cost of capital. GH analyse whether firms’ equity betas (the sensitivity of 
stocks’ returns to fluctuations in returns on market portfolios) vary with the level of 
exposure to Superfund liability. For this they use six alternative exposure measures: 
1) the number of NPL (National Priority List) sites at which a company is named, 2) 
the number of sites proposed for NPL at which a company is named, 3) measure 1 
divided by real market equity, 4) measure 2 divided by real market equity, 5) the sum 
over sites in measure 1 of firm’s shares of market equities of large PRPs at site, 6) 
sum over sites in measure 2 of firm’s shares of market equities of large PRPs at site. 
Estimates from three sets of regressions are reported: in a first set all firms are   19 
included, but results about the impact of Superfund on return rates are ambiguous; in 
fact Superfund increases significantly the cost of capital only for the first two 
exposure measures used . In the other two sets of regressions GH divide the sample of 
firms between High market equity firms and Low market equity firms. For the first 
subsample Superfund increases significantly the cost of capital always, for all six 
exposure measures, while for the second subsample the coefficient relative to 
Superfund liability is not significant for any of the six exposure measures. It seems 
thus that investors of firms belonging to the first subsample are aware of Superfund 
liability and require higher returns for this, while investors of firms in the second 
subsample are not aware of Superfund liability.  
An obvious difference with our paper is the dependent variable: GH want to explain 
the impact that CERCLA had on the cost of capital, and for this they analyse the rates 
of returns on securities. Conversely we want to explain the impact of CERCLA on the 
allocation of credit, and in fact our dependent variable is the proportion of bank 
lending. Moreover, GH do not want to explain the cost of capital in terms of firms’ 
characteristics, the only explanatory variables are market rates of returns and 
Superfund exposure measure. We instead try to explain how bank loans depend on 
the characteristics of the industries. The last difference is the level of data aggregation 
and the sample considered: GH’s sample comprises firms that belong to the chemical 
industry only, but they have monthly observations at firm level. We couldn’t rely on 
this level of data but we had quarterly observations for 14 industries. 
In a paper related to the previous one Barth and McNichols (1994) (BM) investigate 
the relationship between firms’ share prices and estimates of Superfund liabilities. 
BM regress the firms’ market value of equities over firms’ assets, firms’ liabilities 
and a proxy for environmental liability. With no disturbances or omissions the market 
value of equities should be equal to assets minus total liabilities, this is not the case in 
the analysis reported but still it is quite an accounting equality. Environmental 
liability is measured with alternative proxies: number of sites at which a firm is PRP, 
the sum of estimated clean up costs across all sites at which a firm is PRP (treating 
each PRP as 100% liable), partial allocation of remediation costs for each site at 
which a firm is PRP summed across all sites (PRP partially liable). All environmental 
proxies are significantly negative for cross-section time series analysis, while large 
percentages of them are significant for year by year cross section regressions. The 
liability measure with highest explanantory power (highest t-statistics and R-squared) 
is the number of sites at which a firm is nominated PRP.  
The studies surveyed in this section have used firm-level data, but as discussed below 
we were able to use only industry-level data. So some of the variables described 
above, such as age, size, or uniqueness will be difficult to capture with industry-level 
data, while for some others, such as volatility, there may be significant aggregation 
problems.  
3.2 Description of Data and Variables 
We attempted to obtain US firm-level data on capital structure, but it is not possible 
to obtain published data on firms’ bank borrowings. Such data has to be collected 
from the financial accounts of individual firms, and we did not have the resources to 
obtain such data. Nor we were able to gain access to the data sets of researchers who   20 
had collected such data. Thus we were forced to rely on industry-level data on bank 
borrowing; data on bank borrowing and other non-environmental variables was made 
available from Standard and Poor’s. These consisted of  quarterly observations from 
1973 last quarter to 1997 second quarter at industrial level. The 14 industries, 
classified according to SIC code, for which data were available are Food and 
Tobacco, Textiles, Paper, Printing and Publishing, Chemicals, Petroleum and Coal, 
Rubber and Plastics, Stone Clay and Glass, Primary Metals, Fabricated Metals, Non-
Electrical Machinery, Electric and Electronic Equipment, Transportation Equipment, 
Instruments. 
We next capture two different aspects of the impact of environmental liabilities on 
bank borrowing. The first aspect is a measure of the exposure of the different 
industries to clean-up costs under CERCLA. The only observation we had were 
clean-up costs directly related to CERCLA for 1996(2) for the following seven 
industries: Food and Tobacco, Chemicals, Petroleum and Coal, Primary Metals, 
Fabricated Metals, Non-Electrical Machinery, Electric and Electronic Equipment. 
This was available from Resources for the Future. This variable was scaled to the size 
of the industry by dividing it by the value of total industry assets in 1996 (2). 
The second aspect we capture is the different liability regimes, as set out in the three 
phases noted at the start of this section. We captured this by the use of dummy 
variables. The first is a dummy variable (called CERCLA1) that takes the value zero 
from 1973 (4) to 1980 (4), the value one from 1981(1) to 1991(4), and the value zero 
thereafter. This variable is designed to capture the impact of the introduction only of 
CERCLA with environmental liability imposed only on firms. The second is a 
dummy variable (called CERCLA2) that takes the value zero from 1973(4) to 1991(4) 
and one thereafter, and is designed to capture the impact of Fleet Factors, making 
both firms and banks jointly liable.  
These two sets of variables are then multiplied together. So for industries for which 
there is no data on clean-up costs, the environmental dummies are zero throughout; 
for industries for which we had data on clean-up costs, the dummy variables are either 
zero or positive, with the size of the positive variable reflecting the exposure of the 
industry to CERCLA liabilities. 
We now describe the remaining non-environmental variables. The dependent variable 
is long term bank debt as a proportion of total liabilities. The (non-environmental) 
independent variables are: 
•  interest rate: long term real interest rates (three years maturity bonds); this would 
be expected to have a negative effect on demand for bank borrowing, a positive 
effect on supply, and so an ambiguous effect in a reduced-form equation; clearly it 
is also an endogenous variable; 
•  monetary base: this is expected to have a positive effect on the supply of bank 
lending and hence on the reduced-form; 
•  profitability: retained income over sales (net operating revenue). As discussed in 
3.1, this represents an alternative source of funds to firms and so should reduce the 
demand for bank loans; on the other hand it is a measure of the financial health of   21 
the sector and so may make banks more willing to lend. So the overall effect in a 
reduced-form equation is ambiguous. Moreover, as the theoretical model makes 
clear, differences in environmental liability regime will affect firms’ profits, so 
profitability may not be considered to be fully exogenous. 
•  equities: measured as stockholders equities over total assets. While this is not 
exactly the complement of bank debt, as in the capital structure of industries there 
is bank debt, non-bank debt and stockholders equities, it represents an alternative 
source of funds and so will reduce the demand for bank debt. However, it will be 
determined simultaneously with the level of bank debt. 
•  fixed assets ratio: measured as the value of property, plant and equipment as a 
proportion of  total assets. This represents the collateral value of assets and as 
noted in 3.1 this should increase the supply of bank loans. It could also increase 
the demand for loans as to finance the capital investment.  However, as noted 
above, the collateral value of assets diminishes the more highly specialised they 
are. It is difficult to capture this aspect with industry-level data. 
•  current assets ratio: measured by cash and securities divided by total current 
assets. This variable represents the liquidity and we would expect a negative 
impact on the demand for bank debt. However this is more correlated with short 
term debt than with long term debt. 
•  working capital ratio: measured as working capital divided by total assets; plays a 
similar role to current assets ratio. 
•  growth: this is designed to capture growth of investment opportunities. We used 
three different definitions: growth of total assets, growth of capital stock and 
depreciation over total assets; the results reported use the first definition; we 
obtained similar results with other definitions. Firms with high growth of 
investment opportunities will need more long-term debt in order to invest, so this 
will increase the demand for debt. Lenders could also consider firms (or industries) 
with high growth as firms (industries) with high future profitability potential and 
may be more willing to lend. 
•  volatility: measured by the standard deviation of profitability over 12 periods. As 
noted in 3.1, this variable is a proxy of credit riskiness and likelihood of financial 
distress: more volatile firms are more credit risky because they may experience 
more states in which cash flows are too low to repay the debt. The supply of bank 
debt is thus a decreasing function of volatility. On the demand side, more volatile 
firms would  prefer to have the option to renegotiate the debt and thus prefer 
private to public debt. However there is an issue whether this variable is sensibly 
captured at industry level, since a lot of firm-specific volatility could be smoothed 
out by aggregation.  
Before conducting the regressions, we carried out integration tests on all the variables 
and found that they are not integrated. 
The relationships between the explanatory variables and demand and supply of bank 
loans are summarised in table 1.   22 
3.3 Regression results 
Data are cross section-time series so fixed-factors panel regressions are estimated. 
Moreover, because the dependent variable lies between 0 and 1 a logit model is also 
estimated. This implies that coefficients do not really measure the direct effect of the 
explanatory variables on bank debt but rather on a transformed variable. The sign of 
the coefficient has the same meaning of a negative or positive impact of the 
explanatory variables on the dependent variables. While the coefficients of a non 
transformed regression would still be unbiased
7, the transformation was necessary to 
test the significance of the coefficients. Because, as noted in 3.2, there may be 
problems of endogeneity of some variables, in particular interest rates, profitability 
and equities, instrumental variable estimation has been used; instruments are lagged 
values of these variables. This does not change the size and significance of the 
coefficients significantly. Finally, consistent GLS estimation
8 was employed on the 
logit model.  
We employed two variants of the model. The first included interest rates as a 
macroeconomic variable. However, as noted above, it may be considered 
inappropriate to include interest rates as an independent variable in a reduced-form 
regression (even if instrumented), and as an alternative we used a variant with the 
monetary base as a macroeconomic variable. For each variant we ran three models: 
Model I is a base case without any environmental liability variables; Model I 
introduces just the environmental variable CERCLA1; Model III introduces both 
environmental variables CERCLA1 and CERCLA2. Tables 2 and 3 present the 
results of the consistent GLS logit estimations with instrumental variables for Model I 
- III using the interest-rate and monetary-base variants respectively. 
The underlying reduced-form model of bank borrowing is well-behaved: where we 
have been able to predict the sign of a variable, that variable has the correct sign 
(monetary base, equities, fixed asset ratio, current asset ratio, working capital ratio, 
growth); in all cases almost all variables are significant, at least at 10% and mostly at 
5%; and the coefficients are stable across the different models. The empirical results 
also strongly confirm the theory about the impact of environmental liability on bank 
borrowing. The introduction of liability only on the firm has a strong positive effect 
on bank borrowing. When joint liability on firms and banks was introduced following 
Fleet Factors bank borrowing fell; in the interest rate model the coefficient on 
CERCLA2 remains positive and significant, though smaller than on CERCLA2, 
while in the monetary base model, the coefficient on CERCLA2 is positive but 
insignificant, suggesting that borrowing fell back close to its pre-CERCLA level. 
 
3.4  The Impact of CERCLA on US Bank Borrowing 
                                                            
7 It is possible then to use the coefficient of the untransformed regression to tell us something more 
about the impact of the independent variables on the dependent one. For this reason,  simple OLS 
panels were also performed. The OLS results are not reported here. 
8 These are performed by first estimating the variance-covariance matrix using OLS  and then 
estimating  the coefficients using GLS;  the process is then iterated to get better results.   23 
While the regressions confirm the theory set out in section 2, as presented they give 
no indication of the scale of the impact of environmental liability on bank borrowing 
in different industries. To assess this we have the used the model with monetary base 
to predict the effect of the different liability regimes on bank borrowing in different 
industries, ceteris paribus. What we have done is to set all the independent financial 
variables for each industry at their mean values; denote the vector of the variables for 
industry i by Xi . We have then used the estimated coefficients (denoted ! β of the 
monetary-base variant of Model III to calculate the following three estimates of 
expected bank borrowing in industry i with (i) no liability; (ii) liability only on firms; 
(iii) joint liability on firms and banks: 
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where y  is the estimated logit transformation of the proportion of bank debt and z is 
the proportion of bank debt. 
Note that it is only the constant-term which has an industry-specific estimated 
coefficient. The resulting three estimates of expected bank lending for the seven 
industries which have non-zero environmental liability variables are shown in 
columns (1) to (3) of Table 4. Columns (4) and (5) then show the percentage 
difference in expected bank borrowing from the no liability base case that would 
result from imposing environmental liability only on firms, and jointly on firms and 
banks respectively. What this shows is that in industries such as chemicals and 
primary metals which have high CERCLA liabilities, the introduction of liability on 
firms caused a significant increase in bank borrowing (above 15%) as firms tried to 
protect equity-holders from these liabilities. However, if liability is imposed jointly 
on firms and banks, then the impact on bank borrowing relative to no liability is 
trivial. 
4. Conclusions  
In this paper we have analysed the consequences for the capital structure of firms, and 
particularly their use of bank borrowing, of imposing legal environmental liability 
either on firms alone or jointly on firms and banks. We used a simple theoretical 
model to show that the imposition of liability only on firms would lead to an 
inefficiently high use of bank borrowing, as well as an inefficiently low level of effort 
to reduce environmental damage, while imposing liability jointly on firms and banks 
had a more ambiguous effect on bank borrowing, but under plausible assumptions 
would lead to lower bank borrowings than when liability is imposed only on firms, 
and could lead to higher or lower bank borrowings than with no liability at all. We 
then used US industry-level data to estimate a reduced-form model of bank borrowing   24 
which confirmed the theoretical findings and showed that for industries heavily 
exposed to environmental liabilities the imposition of liabilities on firms only had 
caused bank borrowing to rise by 15 - 20%, but then when liability was extended to 
banks, borrowings fell back almost to the level expected without any environmental 
liabilities.  
The research was constrained by the difficulty of getting access to firm-level data, and 
it would be interesting to check if the results are upheld using such data. Further work 
could also be done on the dynamic aspects of the econometric model using industry-
level data. Nevertheless, we believe that our work provides a useful empirical 
analysis of the impact of environmental liabilities on financial structures of firms. 
Moreover our findings suggest that the extension of environmental liability from 
firms to banks, which would be desirable on the grounds of improving the incentives 
for firms to take adequate steps to reduce environmental damage, may not have the 
drastic consequences for bank lending to firms that some commentators had feared.   25 
 
Table 1: Relationship between bank ddebt abd financial variables 
 
Variable Demand  Supply  Net  effect 
Interest Rate  -  +   
Monetary Base    +  + 
Profitability -  +   
Equities -    - 
Fixed Asset Ratio  +  +  + 
Current Asset Ratio  -    - 
Working Capital  -    - 
Growth  + + + 
Volatility +  -   
CERCLA1 +    + 
CERCLA2     
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Table 2:  Estimates of Models I - III Using Interest Rate 
 
Variable  Model I  Model II  Model II 
Interest  Rate  -0.008* -0.016* -0.016* 
Profitability  0.546* 0.726* 0.716* 
Equities  -2.059* -1.967* -1.838* 
Fixed Asset Ratio  2.915*  2.831*  2.863* 
Current Asset Ratio  -0.070  -0.056  -0.062 
Working  Capital -1.957* -1.816* -1.823* 
Growth 0.144  0.169°°°°  0.174°°°°  
Volatility -0.172  -0.168°°°°  -0.172°°°°  
CERCLA1 -  4.139*  5.362* 
CERCLA2 -  -  2.130* 
Adjusted R
2  0.824 0.834 0.835 
 
 
 
 
Table 3:  Estimates of Models I - III Using Monetary Base 
 
Variable  Model I  Model II  Model II 
Monetary  Base  1.016* 1.443* 1.414* 
Profitability 0.353  0.476°°°°  0.479°°°°  
Equities  -1.700* -1.513* -1.499* 
Fixed Asset Ratio  3.154*  3.010*  3.005* 
Current Asset Ratio  -0.125*  -0.120*  -0.120* 
Working  Capital -1.651* -1.307* -1.311* 
Growth  0.165°°°°   0.195* 0.196* 
Volatility  -0.276* -0.303* -0.300* 
CERCLA1 -  4.673*  5.043* 
CERCLA2 -  -  0.701 
Adjusted R
2  0.829 0.841 0.841 
 
 
*  Significant at 5% 
°   Significant at 10% 
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Table 4 Impact of CERCLA on Bank Borrowing 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Industry  Model I  Model II  Model III  (2)/(1) 
% 
(3)/(1) 
% 
Food and Tobacco  10.577  11.061  10.619  4.6  0.8 
Chemicals  6.776 7.965 6.873  17.5  1.4 
Petroleum & Coal  5.387  5.638  5.409  4.7  0.4 
Primary  Metals  8.103 9.367 8.207  15.6  1.3 
Fabricated  Metals  14.865 16.139 14.973  8.6  0.7 
Non-Elec.  Equip. 10.206 10.211 10.207  0.5  0.0 
Electr.  Equip.  6.224 6.305 6.231  1.3  0.1 
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